Markup Pricing and Monetary Policy: A Reexamination of the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy under Imperfect Competition by Baba, Naohiko
If markup ratios fluctuate widely, so does output volume and
investment. This magnifies the business cycle and increases
uncertainty about future economic conditions. This paper
investigates the implication for monetary policy by analyzing
markup ratios. The main conclusions are (1) as a result of the
failure of Japanese firms to fully adjust their prices to exogenous
shocks, markup ratios sometimes greatly deviate from trend
lines. (2) According to the menu-cost theorem, the existence of
costs associated with price changes prevents firms from chang-
ing prices to the level consistent with marginal costs, thus
reducing social welfare. In this regard, establishing a money
supply rule under which monetary authorities accommodate
exogenous shocks provides an incentive for firms to change their
prices. (3) Markup pricing magnifies the social welfare cost 
of inflation. In this argument, monetary authorities have 
the optimal choice of tightening monetary policy even under
low inflation, if they observe that markup ratios have
remained high.
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MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1997Some argue that, if markups move procyclically, the magnitude of business cycles is
increased by the greater fluctuation of corporate profits, possibly impeding sustain-
able growth.
1 For example, Kosai (1992) argues in the light of the experience of the
United States in the 1920s that a type of inflation exists in which a fall in costs 
does not lead to a fall in prices, and that the monetary authorities should tighten
monetary conditions in such situations despite apparent price stability.
According to Rothbard (1963), in the 1920s the Federal Reserve was deceived by
the apparent price stability then existing and failed to tighten monetary policy expe-
ditiously, when in fact profits were being inflated by an improvement in productivity
and declining costs. As a result, a sharp increase in stock prices was caused on Wall
Street, followed by the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the
1930s. In this view, the objective of monetary policy is not simply to maintain price
stability but to maintain the price level consistent with cost structures. 
If markups are maintained at a level higher than optimal after external shocks
(e.g., a favorable oil shock or sharp yen appreciation) occur, the welfare that should
belong to the consumers (i.e., consumers’ surplus) is transferred to the producers (as
producers’ surplus), and social welfare, which is the sum of both surpluses, is
reduced. From this standpoint, social welfare considerations may dictate that the
price level be lowered to the marginal cost corresponding to a business cycle phase or
a particular external shock. If so, it is worthwhile to discuss what role monetary
policy can play in attaining that objective.
Unfortunately, little theoretical research has so far been done in this context, mak-
ing it impossible at this time to reach a consensus on policy implications. However,
the few existing theories may broadly be classified into the following two types.
2 First,
there are the lines of the New Keynesian theories, represented mainly by the theories
of menu cost and near-rationality. The thrust of these theories is that the attempt to
use monetary policy to influence aggregate demand creates incentives for firms to
revise prices by raising the opportunity cost of not revising them. 
Thus, monetary policy controls the markups of firms by shifting the aggregate
demand curve appropriately, and makes it possible to enhance social welfare.
However, as will be discussed later, this line of argument has been criticized as
follows: (1) this is contrary to the experience at the time of the first oil shock; and 
(2) changes in markups are essentially determined by the degree of competition in
the market, and cannot be controlled by monetary instruments alone.
The second type of argument stresses the social welfare cost of inflation when
there is markup pricing. According to Goodfriend (1995), when the goods market is
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1. Empirical studies in the United States generally show that markups are countercyclical. For Japan, however, more
studies show that markups are procyclical. See, for example, Ariga and Ohkusa (1994), Nishimura and Inoue
(1994), and Baba (1995).
2. In addition, there are game-theoretic models of cooperation failure or coordination failure, when the firm is
assumed to have price-setting power. As will be shown later, however, these models assume that prices are flexible
with respect to external shocks.
I. Introductionunder imperfect competition and markup pricing is in operation, the social welfare
cost of inflation is given by the product of the social welfare cost under perfect
competition shown by Lucas (1993) and the marginal markup ratio. This type of
argument provides an interpretation as to why the monetary authorities should pay
attention to the markup ratio when seeking to minimize the social welfare cost of
inflation. That is to say, if the markup ratio is in fact observed or forecast to remain
substantially high for some reason, the socially optimal policy for the monetary
authorities is to tighten monetary conditions further so as to reduce the rate of
inflation, even though the nominal rate of inflation may remain low and stable.
These theories, however, are nothing more than propositions because of data limi-
tations as well as many unresolved technical problems relating to the method of cal-
culating the marginal markup ratio. Moreover, the cumulative body of research in
this area is inadequate. This paper will introduce and organize major theoretical
issues by citing, as appropriate, empirical analyses based on the industry-wide data of
the past 20 years, as follows:
[1] First, we calculate the benchmark markup ratios (assumed to be constant dur-
ing the sample period) by the methodology of Hall (1988), which utilizes the proper-
ties of Solow residuals. We then obtain the variable markup ratios by adjusting the
benchmark ratios by the input ratios of various inputs as well as by the rates of
change of input prices, and observe how the markup ratios changed for different
groups of industries over the past 20 years. We will make a simple analysis of the rela-
tionship between the markup ratios, business cycles, indexes of average profits, and
various external shocks that are thought to affect directly the structure of marginal
cost, such as the two oil shocks and the sharp yen appreciation following the Plaza
Accord (Section II).
[2] We use the New Keynesian theory of menu cost to organize our ideas con-
cerning the effectiveness of monetary policy, when firms set prices in consideration of
the cost of changing prices under conditions of imperfect competition with markup
pricing. We then investigate empirically whether or not firms actually set prices 
in consideration of the cost of revising prices. We add a critical assessment of the 
menu-cost theorem (Section III).
[3] We will clarify how the discussion of the usual social welfare cost of inflation
should be modified when there is markup pricing in the goods market. We will then
estimate the social welfare cost of inflation over the past 20 years or so, in an attempt
to grasp quantitatively how the markups that were kept high lowered social welfare
(Section IV).
The major points of the paper can be summarized as follows:
[1]  The price-setting behavior of Japanese industries did not fully adjust to exter-
nal shocks that affected marginal cost, such as the oil shocks and the sharp yen appre-
ciation following the Plaza Accord. Thus, the markup ratio temporarily deviated
substantially from the trend line. Moreover, the deviation of the markup ratio from 
the trend line when there was an external shock was found to be greater in the 
manufacturing sector than in the non-manufacturing sector.
[2] The markup ratio tended to remain roughly constant for the manufacturing
sector, while it had a declining trend in the non-manufacturing sector, particularly
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industries had been tightly regulated, the importance of deregulation and other
competition promotion policies is underscored.
[3] In connection with business cycles, the market ratio was generally procyclical
for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, although the procyclicality
is weak. It is thus possible to conjecture that the impact of the business cycle on the
markup ratios is relatively small in Japan and that the impact of oil shocks and other
external shocks is much more important.
[4] According to the menu-cost theorem, when there is a cost associated with
revising prices under imperfect competition, firms are unable to change prices suffi-
ciently in response to an external shock that has changed marginal cost. As a result,
the markup ratio fluctuates sharply, thus lowering social welfare. Under these situa-
tions, it becomes possible to increase social welfare in the long run by supplying
money so as to accommodate external shocks, because such a policy will provide
firms with incentives to revise prices sufficiently.
[5] By examining whether or not firms actually set prices in explicit consideration
of the cost of revising prices in terms of a simple multi-equation model, the signifi-
cance level of the parameter associated with price revision was found to be high for
both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, suggesting the high probability
that firms set prices in consideration of the cost of revising prices. Also, it was found
that the level and statistical significance of the parameter were higher in the non-
manufacturing sector than in the manufacturing sector. This empirical result may be
interpreted as supporting the appropriateness of the assumptions underlying the
menu-cost theorem to some extent.
[6] However, the ability of the menu-cost theorem to prescribe policy is limited by
its failure to consider the role of inflationary expectations explicitly. For example,
when there is an oil shock or some other external shock that tends to increase marginal
cost, the theorem prescribes that monetary policy be eased to prompt firms to revise
prices. This does not fit the experience of the period of strong inflationary expectations.
[7] Inflation forces firms and households to spend more time and energy on
search activities by increasing the variance of prices. This is the thrust of the discus-
sion concerning the social welfare cost of inflation. It should be noted, however, that
much of the existing discussion assumes that the goods market is under perfect com-
petition. Under the framework of imperfect competition, changes in the markup
ratio reduce the volume of employment, hence the real wage, through a reduction in
the volume of output. Then, there arise consequences that are not considered under
the usual framework of perfect competition, whereby consumers have no choice but
to spend more time on search activities, thus creating a loss of social welfare.
[8] By making an estimate of the social cost of inflation in full consideration of
these effects, we find that the social welfare cost of inflation amounted to 3 percent–
6 percent of real GDP at the time of the two oil shocks. For the period after the Plaza
Accord, the fall in the rate of inflation led to a reduction of the social welfare cost to
less than 2 percent of GDP. This indicates that the positive effect of the fall in the
rate of inflation on social welfare exceeded the negative effect of the increase in the
markup ratio. Thus, it was ascertained that the social welfare cost of inflation was
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high. However, the social welfare cost began to rise considerably from 1987 to 1990.
[9] When the analysis of the paper is taken as a whole, we may reach the follow-
ing tentative conclusion. There are objections to the view that monetary policy can
directly affect the markup ratio of firms in the manner suggested by the menu-cost
theorem. However, in view of the discussion of the social welfare cost of inflation
when there is markup pricing, it is possible to regard changes in the markup ratio as
providing useful information for the monetary authorities.
II. Observation of the Markup Ratio
A. Methodology of Deriving the Markup Ratio
Several studies have estimated the markup ratios of Japanese industries. However,
only a few studies have derived the marginal markup ratio (defined as the ratio of
price to marginal cost) from any theoretical basis. The greatest problem in deriving
the marginal markup ratio is that marginal cost is not directly observable. Existing
studies in Japan have often regarded the ratio of sales to costs obtained from the
Ministry of Finance’s Quarterly Statistics of Financial Statements of Incorporated
Enterprises or the ratio of output price to input price obtained from the Bank of
Japan’s Input-Output Price Indexes of Manufacturing Industry by Sector as a proxy of
the markup ratio. Although both sets of data are easily obtainable on a quarterly or
monthly basis, it is important to note that the markup ratio so obtained is a concept
based on average cost. In deriving marginal cost by estimating the cost function,
moreover, there are always problems regarding the choice of functional form and the
estimation problem of multicollinearity.
In order to avoid these problems, Hall (1988) has proposed a method of
estimating the markup ratio using Solow residuals. The method of Hall is receiving
increasing attention because it does not suffer from arbitrariness in the choice of
functional form.
3 However, the method is based on the strict assumption that the
markup ratio is constant over time.
4 In this paper, we consider the markup ratio
obtained by the Hall-type methodology for each industry group as the average for the
sample period, and transform it into a variable ratio by adjusting it by annual
changes in factor prices and factor input ratios.
5 This allows us to derive theoretically
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3. Applications of this methodology include Haskel, Martin, and Small (1995) and Ariga et al. (1992).
4. The markup ratio derived by this method does not allow an analysis of whether it reflects the degree of vertical
integration or changes in the elasticity of demand.
5. See Benabou (1992) for details.
6. See Appendix 1 for the derivation.
7. There is an alternative view that, when discussing the markup ratio in the context of monetary policy, purchaser
prices (inclusive of transportation and sales margins) are preferable to producer prices, which are used in the text.
However, because of the need to clarify industry-specific characteristics, the paper uses producer prices even for
the wholesale and retail industry by treating it as an economic entity in which factor inputs are used to produce
output. Because there has been an increasing number of commodities with open pricing in recent years, the
difference between the two indexes is likely to diminish in the future.cost, and markup ratios are all expressed in output terms, including intermediate 
inputs.
8
B. Time-Series Variations in Price, Marginal Cost, and the Markup Ratio
The markup ratio has been derived for five manufacturing and eight non-manufacturing
industries.
9 In this section, we will show only the results for the broad categories of the
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors in order to grasp the overall picture.
10
In Figure 1, P indicates output price, and MC marginal cost, both expressed in terms
of the deviation rate from the period average; m is the calculated markup ratio
(price/marginal cost). From this, we observe for both the manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors that the markup ratio deviated substantially from the trend
line because it could not adjust sufficiently to such external shocks as the first and the sec-
ond oil shocks and the sharp appreciation of the yen following the Plaza Accord.
The fluctuation of the markup ratio arising from an external shock was observed
to be greater for the manufacturing sector than for the non-manufacturing sector.
Presumably, this reflects the fact that the share of intermediate inputs in total factors
of production is greater in the manufacturing sector, so that the impact of external
shocks on marginal cost is greater. For this reason, the price-setting behavior of man-
ufacturing firms could not keep up with the changes in marginal cost. As a general
tendency, while the markup ratio of the manufacturing sector remained roughly con-
stant, the markup ratio of the non-manufacturing sector showed a clear downward
trend, although, even during the most recent past, the markup ratio of the non-
manufacturing sector remained considerably higher than that of the manufacturing
sector. This implies that, although the non-manufacturing sector has become more
competitive because of deregulation and other long-run competition promoting
measures, it remains much less competitive than the manufacturing sector, which is
facing competition from imports.
11
In terms of further breakdown by type of industry within the manufacturing
sector, the markup ratio of the transportation equipment industry tended to decline.
In the non-manufacturing sector, the markup ratios of the wholesale and retail,
finance and insurance, and other services industries have shown a downward trend
(see Appendix 2).
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8. See Baba (1995) for the bias that results when value-added data are used.
9. The sample for estimation covers the five industry groups of foodstuffs, textiles, pulp and paper, general machin-
ery, and transportation equipment in the manufacturing sector, and the eight industry groups of agriculture,
forestry, and fisheries; mining; construction; electric power, gas, and water; wholesale and retail; finance and
insurance; transportation and telecommunications; and other services in the non-manufacturing sector. The
choice of these industry groups was dictated by the ability to obtain stable markup ratios for the sample period by
applying the methodology of Hall (1988) to output-based data inclusive of intermediate inputs (for details, see
Baba [1995]). In the analysis of this section, moreover, we used output-based prices, inclusive of intermediate
inputs, as the price variables; and the wage rate used was the per capita wage obtained by dividing employee
income by the number of employees. Volume of output, output prices, number of employees, the value of inter-
mediate inputs, and intermediate input prices, employee income, fixed capital depreciation, and indirect taxes
(negative subsidies) were obtained from the Economic Planning Agency, National Accounts; industry-wide 
data on capital stock were obtained from the Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on Capital Stock of
Private Enterprises.
10. For the other results, see Appendix 2.
11. On this point, see Baba (1995).33
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C. The Relationship between the Markup Ratio and Major Economic Variables
Next, let us look at the relationship between the markup ratio, as calculated above,
and some representative economic variables (such as the growth rate of real GDP,
indexes of business conditions, the ratio of current profits to sales, and the ratio of
sales to costs). Of these, the growth rate of real GDP and indexes of business condi-
tions are meant to capture the business cycle, while the ratio of current profits to sales34 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1997
and the ratio of sales to costs are meant to represent the indexes of average profits, as
opposed to the marginal markup ratio calculated in the text.
First, from the results of the regression analysis reported in Table 1, we find that
the markup ratio was procyclical with business conditions. However, particularly for
the manufacturing sector, the procyclicality is extremely weak. How are we to under-
stand this result? Theoretically speaking, there are many views of the relationship
between the markup ratio and the business cycle, so that the direction of influence
cannot unequivocally be ascertained. The most basic view stresses the condition for
profit maximization by the monopoly firm. From the condition of profit maximiza-
tion (i.e., the equating of marginal cost with marginal revenue), the higher the price
elasticity of demand is, the lower the markup ratio. Because the price elasticity of
demand is considered to be procyclical and to move in line with business conditions,
the markup ratio should become countercyclical.
On the other hand, from the point of view of industrial organization theory, there
exist two theories. In situations where there is a collusive price agreement in an oli-
gopolistic market, whether or not a firm will breach the agreement depends on
whether or not the increase in present gains from breaching the agreement exceeds
the resulting expected loss in future collusive gains. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)
assume that a stochastic demand shock determines the condition of the economy.
When current demand is large and business conditions are good, the gains from
breaching the agreement become greater, and the markup ratio declines. As a result,
the markup ratio shows a countercyclical movement.
In contrast, if expectations of even greater future demand during the period of
good business conditions predominate, the firm may increase the markup ratio.
Conversely, the firm lowers the markup ratio during a period of unfavorable business
conditions. Hence, in this view the markup ratio should move procyclically with
business conditions (Haltiwanger and Harrington [1991]).
Thus, theoretically there is no unequivocal relationship between the markup ratio
and the business cycle. The result of the empirical analysis may be a reflection of this
ambiguity. During the past 20 years or so, it is possible to conjecture that the markup









1.248 0.001 0.274 — 0.072 1.699
(14.471)*  (1.032) (0.773) —    
1.253 0.001 — 0.001 0.051 1.729
(14.282)*** (0.959) — (0.441) 
Non- 1.619 –0.002 0.282 — 0.459 1.971
manufacturing (38.701)*** (–3.135)*** (1.639) —  
1.615 –0.002 — 0.002 0.495 1.892
(39.313)*** (–3.093)*** — (1.927)*
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate that the statistic is significant at the
10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
The index of business conditions is a coincident index (/10).35
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12. Truly external shocks are limited to such exceptional ones as earthquakes. It is said that what appears to be an
external shock is often closely connected with a domestic problem. Okina (1995) argues that even oil shocks, yen
appreciation, and the introduction of an indirect tax, which are usually treated as external shocks, should in fact
be treated as internal shocks under some conditions.
ratios of various industrial sectors in Japan were influenced more by external shocks
12
that directly affect the structure of marginal cost than by the business cycle.
Second, let us look at the relationship with the ratio of current profits to sales and the
















Figure 2  The Markup Ratio and the Indicator of Average Profits




Note: Solid line represents the markup ratio (right scale), and dotted line repre-
















Markup ratio Markup ratio
R
2 D.W. (current) (previous)
Manufacturing
15.189 0.061 –12.342 — 0.185 1.361
(1.442) (1.559) (–1.527) —
–18.210 0.035 — 14.266 0.225 1.098
(–1.755)* (0.926) — (1.823)*
Non- –14.486   0.039 8.916 — 0.230 0.941
manufacturing (–1.414) (2.242)** (1.412) —
–21.576 0.048 — 13.155 0.354 1.719
(–2.367)** (2.933)*** — (2.371)**
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate that the statistic is significant at the
10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
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nOrdinary Least Squares
Constant Time trend
Markup ratio Markup ratio
R
2 D.W. (current) (previous)
Manufacturing
1.314 0.002 –0.194 — 0.433 1.030
(7.895)*** (3.531)*** (–1.516) —
0.921 0.002 — 0.121 0.386 0.643
(5.263)*** (2.930)*** — (0.916)
Non- 0.745 0.004 0.064 — 0.875 0.646
manufacturing (2.921)*** (9.377)*** (0.412) —
0.713 0.004 — 0.084 0.976 0.725
(2.889)*** (9.265)*** — (0.558)
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate that the statistic is significant at the





























Note: Solid line represents the markup ratio (right scale), and dotted line repre-
sents the ratio of sales to costs (left scale [percent]).
[2] Relationship with the Ratio of Sales to Costs
nGraphical Presentation
For both, a quick look seems to indicate no clear relationship with the markup ratio.
However, regression analysis shows a statistically significant correlation between the
ratio of current profits to sales and the lagged value of the markup ratio (in the
preceding period), although there was no statistically significant relationship for the
ratio of sales to costs. Roughly speaking, this suggests the possibility that the
marginal markup ratio, as calculated in the text, can serve as a leading indicator of
average profits.III. Theoretical Issues Relating to the Effectiveness 
of Monetary Policy under Imperfect Competition
A. A Review of the Theoretical Framework
From the rough observation of the previous section, we have found that the markup
ratio often deviated substantially from the trend line in Japan. This reflects not only
the presence of various degrees of market power in many of the industries but also
the inability of the price-setting behavior of firms to keep up with changes in mar-
ginal cost when there was an external shock, such as the oil shocks and the sharp yen
appreciation. Under the conditions of imperfect competition with markup pricing,
what role can monetary policy play? In this section, we will take up the menu-cost
theorem as a representative New Keynesian framework in order to discuss the
effectiveness of monetary policy.
At the outset, we need to clarify why we want to use a New Keynesian framework
for the purpose of our discussion in the paper. To do so, let us schematically organize
the various existing theoretical frameworks in the light of the discussion of the previ-
ous section. Silvastre (1993) classifies the major existing frameworks into four cate-
gories from the standpoints of (1) the responsiveness of price to an external shock;
and (2) the existence or absence of market power.
According to this classification (Table 2), theoretical frameworks applicable to the
situation of market power include models of cooperation or coordination failure
based on game theory, and New Keynesian-type models based on menu cost, etc. 
In terms of the first type, the model of cooperation failure,
13 for example, requires
that the rules of the game be changed in order to improve social welfare. 
On the other hand, in the model of coordination failure in which there are multiple
equilibria, a one-time implementation of monetary policy can serve as a signal and
thereby create an incentive for the players to change prices, thus leading the economy to
a Pareto optimal equilibrium.
14 Although these models do provide interesting insights into
the management of monetary policy, they both assume that prices are flexible. From the
observation made in the previous section, however, prices are sticky with respect to exter-
nal shocks. Thus, we will adopt a New Keynesian-type approach in discussing the
effectiveness of monetary policy throughout this paper.
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Table 2  Classification of Theoretical Frameworks
Responsiveness of price to an external shock 
Responsive Sticky
Market
No New classical model Keynesian model (IS-LM model)
Yes
Cooperation failure New Keynesian model power
Coordination failure (menu cost, near-rational model)
Source: Silvastre, J., “The Market-Power Foundation of Macroeconomic Policy,” Journal of Economic
Literature, 31, 1993, p. 106.
13. The case of the prisoner’s dilemma is an example.
14. For details, see Cooper and Andrew (1988).B. The Role of Monetary Policy in New Keynesian Models
1. Cost of revising prices and the price-setting behavior of firms
Here, we will present a framework for examining the effectiveness of monetary policy
under the conditions of imperfect competition with markup pricing and sticky
prices, by referring to Akerlof and Yellen (1985).
15
The market is not under perfect competition, so that the firm has price-setting
power. When there is an external shock and marginal cost is changed, it is desirable
from the point of view of social welfare that the firm change the price in accordance
with the change in marginal cost. However, there is a possibility that, because of the
existence of the cost of revising prices (menu cost), the firm does not change the price
in accordance with the change of marginal cost, thus creating a loss for society.
Figure 3 depicts the price-setting behavior of the firm when an external shock
reduces the marginal cost from MC0 to MC1. In the absence of menu cost, the firm
can maximize profits by changing the price
16 from P0 to P1 in accordance with the
reduction in marginal cost. This is the best choice for the firm from the standpoint of
profit maximization. However, when there is a menu cost, the firm changes the price
only under the following conditions.
That is to say, the firm has an incentive to change the price only when the differ-
ence (given by HGC) between the producers’ surplus (a) when the price is at P0
(given by ABCD) and the producers’ surplus (b) when the price is at P1 (given by
EFGD) exceeds the cost of changing the price. This cost of changing prices can be
accompanied by a social cost. To understand this point, we will consider the follow-
ing three cases.
17 For simplicity, the social surplus (the sum of the producers’ surplus
and the consumers’ surplus) when the price is at P0 is denoted as g, and the social
surplus when the price is at P1 is denoted as d.
(a) d – g  > menu cost >b– a.
Although it is socially desirable to change the price, the firm does not change the
price, thus causing inefficiency. Then, the presence of menu cost creates a social cost.
(b) Menu cost >d– g>b– a.
For both society and the firm, it is optimal not to change the price. In this case,
there is no social inefficiency.
(c) d – g>b– a>menu cost.
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15. Akerlof and Yellen (1985) in fact do not use the term menu cost. Instead, they use the term “near-rational” to
refer to the possible presence of market participants who do not necessarily behave rationally. Regardless of which
term is used, the essence of the argument is the same.
16. To be precise, the price should be defined as a relative price, i.e., the ratio of the price of the commodity con-
cerned to the general price level. For simplicity of presentation, however, the price is here expressed as the price
of the commodity in question.
17. In terms of Figure 3, d – g corresponds to BFGC, and b – a corresponds to HGC. Thus, it is sufficient to
consider these three combinations.For both society and the firm, it is optimal to change the price. Thus, in this case,
there is no social inefficiency.
2. The effectiveness of monetary policy
a) An analytical framework
When there is no menu cost so that the firm can smoothly change the price to a level
desirable for profit maximization, money is neutral both in the short run and in the
long run, rendering monetary policy ineffective. However, in cases where social inef-
ficiency is generated as in (a) above, monetary policy can affect the real economy 
and have a positive impact on social welfare. In what follows, we will discuss the
effectiveness of monetary policy separately for the short run and for the long run. 
Suppose that there is an external shock that reduces marginal cost, such as a sharp
yen appreciation (Figure 4). In this case, the firm is faced with a decision as to
whether or not it should change the price from P0 to P1. When the firm does not
change the price because of the menu cost, as in the case of (a) above, social ineffi-
ciency is generated. In such a case, monetary tightening can be effective in the short
run as it causes a leftward shift of the demand curve. We will consider the effect of
monetary tightening below. If the firm keeps the price unchanged at P0 because of
the menu cost, the leftward shift of the demand curve causes the quantity demanded
to move from Q0 to Q1. For this reason, with the price left unchanged, the profit of
the firm is reduced substantially. This creates an incentive for the firm to reduce the
price. In this manner, monetary tightening can reduce the markup ratio and thus
improve social welfare, when an external shock reduces marginal cost.
On the other hand, however, monetary tightening can also exert deflationary
pressure in the short run. In the long run, however, because the firm reduces the
price in the manner described above, money becomes neutral, and the demand curve
returns to the initial position, eliminating deflationary pressure. Thus, when there is
an external shock that reduces marginal cost, the optimal choice from the point of
39
















Figure 3  Price-Setting Behavior of the Firm as a Result of a Change in Marginal Costview of social welfare is to tighten monetary conditions so as to accommodate the
external shock.
Similarly, when there is an external shock that raises marginal cost (e.g., oil shocks
and the Gulf War), it is desirable to ease monetary conditions so as to create an
incentive for the firm to raise prices.
b) A simulation exercise involving menu cost, monetary policy, and the social
surplus
Here, we will introduce the simulation exercise of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) as
a way of ascertaining that monetary policy can create an incentive for the firm to
change prices by increasing the opportunity cost associated with not changing prices
because of the menu cost.
18
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) consider two money supply rules to estimate 
the potential loss to the firm from not changing the price in the goods market
because of the menu cost, as well as the associated loss in utility to the worker from
not changing wage rates in the labor market. They then estimate the change in social
welfare in the short run (tables 3 and 4).
19
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18. This type of simulation was also conducted by Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Ball and Romer (1990).
19. The model is so designed that the firm choosing not to revise prices because of the menu cost does not change











Figure 4  The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy
MC0: Marginal cost curve prior to the shock 
MC1: Marginal cost curve after the shock
D0(MR0): Initial demand curve (the corresponding marginal revenue curve)
D1(MR1): Demand curve after tightening of monetary policy (the corresponding marginal
revenue curve)
P0(Q0): Price (quantity) under initial equilibrium
P1(Q1): Price (quantity) after the shock
Q2: Quantity that would result if the price were maintained at P0 despite the shift in demand
curve
P*(Q*): Equilibrium (short-run equilibrium) after the tightening of monetary policy41
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According to their trial estimates, the potential loss (opportunity cost) associated
with keeping the price unchanged becomes larger as the money supply is increased,
indicating that a rightward shift of the demand curve can bring about a large increase
in social welfare relative to the menu cost. This result does not much depend on the
assumed magnitude of various parameters that constitute the model. If the cost of
changing prices is actually kept constant, we do find that, as the money supply is
increased, the potential loss from not changing the price is increased, giving an
incentive for the firm to change the price.
Table 3  Losses to the Firm and the Worker Associated with the Presence of Menu Cost
(a) Loss to the firm from not revising the price (b) Loss in utility to the worker from not revising
(percent level of initial revenue) the wage rate (percent level of initial revenue)
M1/M0 =   M1/M0 =
a q 1.05 1.10 b s 1.05 1.10
1.0 5 0.000 0.000 1.2 5 0.025 0.100
1.1 5 0.003 0.013 1.4 5 0.066 0.265
1.1 2 0.001 0.004 1.4 2 0.027 0.111
20 0.008 0.031 20 0.105 0.418
1.3 5 0.018 0.071 1.6 5 0.112 0.451
Note: M0: Initial nominal money balance 
M1: Nominal money balance after the change
a: Inverse of the indicator of the economy of scale 
b: Substitutability of marginal disutility of labor
q: Elasticity of substitution between goods in the utility function
s: Elasticity of substitution between factors of production (here, there exist n types of labor)
Source: Blanchard, O., and N. Kiyotaki, “Monopolistic Competition and Effects of Aggregate Demand,”
American Economic Review, 77, 1987, pp. 647–666.
Table 4  Sum of Losses to the Firm and the Worker and the Change in Social Welfare
M1/M0 = 1.05 M1/M0 = 1.10
ab Sum of Change in  Sum of Change in
losses A social welfare B/A losses A social welfare B/A
(percent) B (percent) (percent) B (percent)
(q = s = 5)
1.1 1.2 0.03 1.79 60 0.11 3.54 32
1.4 0.07 1.83 26 0.28 3.60 13
1.6 0.11 1.91 17 0.46 3.72 8
1.2 1.2 0.04 1.82 45 0.15 3.57 24
1.4 0.08 1.87 24 0.33 3.67 11
1.6 0.13 1.98 15 0.53 3.85 7
(q = s = 10)
1.1 1.2 0.03 0.94 31 0.11 1.86 17
1.4 0.03 1.02 17 0.23 1.93 17
1.6 0.06 1.11 12 0.36 2.05 8
1.2 1.2 0.04 0.99 25 0.16 1.87 12
1.4 0.07 1.07 16 0.29 2.01 7
1.6 0.11 1.27 12 0.44 2.42 5
Source: Blanchard, O., and N. Kiyotaki, “Monopolistic Competition and Effects of Aggregate Demand,”
American Economic Review, 77, 1987, pp. 647–666.However, although the trial estimates do suggest that an increase in the money sup-
ply certainly works in the direction of creating an incentive for the firm to change the
price, it is debatable whether or not the estimated loss is sufficiently large to force the firm
actually to change the price. It should be noted in this context, however, that the trial esti-
mates do not take into consideration the loss associated with the external shock that
affects the structure of marginal cost (i.e., the shock that increases marginal cost, such as
an oil shock). In this sense, the estimated loss is underestimated to that extent.
3. An empirical analysis of the existence of the cost of revising prices
The assumption underlying the preceding menu-cost theorem is that the firm sets
prices in explicit recognition of the cost of revising prices. Although this point is
extremely important, it has not been subjected to much empirical analysis. Thus, we
will below take a macroeconomic model approach by estimating a system of struc-
tural equations that is based on a theoretical foundation and allows an easy interpre-
tation. Estimation will be performed separately for the manufacturing sector and the
non-manufacturing sector.
a) A basic framework
When the firm faces a demand curve with a constant price elasticity, it determines the
price at a level given by the product of marginal cost and the markup ratio (as specified
by the price elasticity) so as to maximize profits (or minimize cost), provided that
there is no menu cost. However, when there is a menu cost, the behavior of the firm is
modified as follows. First, the objective function of the firm becomes the amount of
profits obtainable with the optimal price level in the absence of menu cost less (1) the cost
attributable to the difference between the optimal price level in the absence of menu cost
(corresponding to the level given by the product of marginal cost and the markup ratio)
and the current price level (expressed as the squared difference in log-linear form); and
(2) the cost of changing prices (expressed as the squared difference between the price of
the previous periods and the current price in log-linear form). From the maximization
of this objective function, it becomes possible to express the current price as a nonlinear
function of the optimal price when there is no menu cost and the price of the previous
periods, making it feasible to perform a regression analysis.
20
Roberts, Stockton, and Struckmeyer (1994) present one of the few studies that
have used this concept to analyze empirically different manufacturing industries in
the United States. The problem with their model, however, is that, although there is
only one equation to be estimated, there are two endogenous variables (i.e., price and
output). Thus, theoretically, these two variables cannot be distinguished. Thus, in
this section, in order both to avoid this problem and to clarify the economic mean-
ings of estimated parameters, we will simultaneously estimate the system of three
structural equations, consisting of the demand function, the Cobb-Douglas cost
function,
21 and the price-setting function.
22
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20. For the derivation and specification of a system of estimation equations, see Appendix 3.
21. The assumption of the cost function takes either of the following forms: (1) a reduction of cost associated with
technical progress is constant (so that it is treated as part of the constant term); and (2) technical progress occurs
at a constant rate every year (so that the cost reduction is treated as a trend term).
22. Except for the income variable and the rental cost of capital, the data used here are the same as the data used in
Section II. For the income variable, we have used real GDP. In estimating the rental cost of capital, the usual43
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b) Estimation results
According to the estimation results (Table 5), the coefficient of determination is high
for each of the three equations, and all the parameters are significant and have the
expected signs. The parameter relating to price revision is statistically significant at 
1 percent for both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, indicating the
practice is to express interest rates in real terms by using the rate of the rise of capital goods prices as the deflator.
In this paper, however, we did not express them in real terms because of the following problems: (1) immediately
following the oil shock, capital goods prices rose sharply, causing the real interest rate to become negative; 
(2) when nominal interest rates fall along with the fall in the price level, the markup ratio apparently declines
because the real interest rate and the rental cost of capital do not change; and (3) there is a possibility that the
relationship between capital goods prices and investment depends on the expectations of future prices, and
cannot be ascertained unequivocally. In this paper, the rental cost of capital rK is estimated as follows.
rK = fixed capital depreciation + subscriber’s yield on 10-year government bonds 
´ real stock of capital ´ the index of capital goods prices.
Real GDP, subscriber’s yield on 10-year government bonds, and capital goods prices are obtained from the
Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual.
Table 5  Estimation Results of the System of Equations (Seemingly Unrelated Regression)
Parameter
Manufacturing Non-manufacturing
With trend term Without trend term With trend term Without trend term
Demand function
Constant 0.117 0.032 –0.873 –0.229
(0.376) (0.102) (–3.515)*** (–0.863) 
Price elasticity –0.109 –0.154 –0.091 –0.128
(–3.364)*** (–4.090)*** (–4.801)*** (–3.836)***
Income elasticity 0.984 0.990 1.074 1.008
(40.011)*** (39.981)*** (54.962)*** (48.210)***
R
2 0.988 0.988 0.998 0.990
Cost function
Constant — 0.795 — 0.967
(—) (5.903)*** (—) (6.305)***
Trend term –0.008 — –0.004 —
(–10.963)*** (—) (–3.511)*** (—)
Wage rate 0.226 0.097 0.425 0.099
(11.986)*** (5.787)*** (10.945)*** (5.163)***
Capital rental ratio 0.048 0.074 0.043 0.068
(4.916)*** (5.328)*** (2.833)*** (5.103)***
Intermediate input price 0.778 0.918 0.425 0.940
(53.512)*** (36.031)*** (10.945)*** (37.850)***
R
2 0.995 0.996 0.998 0.995
Price-setting function
Constant 1.074 1.069 1.194 1.194
(22.828)*** (16.337)*** (42.837)*** (35.706)***
Parameter related 0.083 0.148 0.235 0.224
to price changes (2.815)*** (4.157)*** (4.776)*** (5.662)***
R
2 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate that the statistic is significant at the
10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.possibility that firms do set prices in consideration of the cost of revising prices. 
The parameter is more significant and greater in value for the non-manufacturing
sector, suggesting that non-manufacturing firms are more conscious of the cost of
revising prices.
4. A summary and critical examination of the menu-cost theorem
Let us summarize the argument of this section. Where there is a cost of revising
prices under conditions of imperfect competition, the firm cannot change the price
sufficiently in response to an external shock that changes marginal cost. As a result,
the markup ratio changes substantially, and social welfare is reduced significantly. In
such cases, it is possible to improve social welfare in the long run by establishing a
money supply rule to accommodate the external shock, thereby creating an incentive
for firms to revise prices. 
An empirical analysis based on a simple system of equations suggests the possibil-
ity that, both for the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, firms set prices
in explicit consideration of the cost of revising prices. Although the empirical results
are indirect, they may to some extent establish the feasibility of the menu-cost theo-
rem. On the other hand, it is also true that many objections exist to the menu-cost
theorem. Some of the representative objections are reviewed below.
The first objection stresses the experience at the time of the first oil shock.
Heightened inflationary expectations were caused primarily by the substantial easing
of monetary policy (the “excessive liquidity” phenomenon) in 1971 and 1972, and
then the rising prices resulting from the first oil shock of 1973 were curtailed by the
consistent tightening of monetary policy. Thus, the economy was temporarily placed
in a deflationary situation in 1975 before starting on a relatively smooth recovery
path. What then would have happened if an accommodative monetary policy had
been pursued, as suggested by the menu-cost theorem? Many argue that inflationary
expectations would have been accelerated, preventing the economy from resuming a
smooth recovery path.
In response, we may argue in the following way. As explained in this section, 
the most basic menu-cost theorem is static, and does not explicitly consider the 
role of inflationary expectations. If the cumulative effect of easy monetary policy
prior to the first oil shock had raised the inflationary expectations of economic
agents, the demand curve should have shifted rightward to that extent.
23 Then, it is
possible to argue that the monetary tightening after the first oil shock was a necessary
measure to offset the rightward shift of the demand curve caused by the increase in
inflationary expectations.
Taking this line of argument, if such an external shock as the oil shock occurs
when inflationary expectations have been eliminated, it may be desirable from the
standpoint of increasing social welfare to accommodate the change in marginal cost
by easing monetary policy, as suggested by menu-cost theorem. It is, however, neces-
sary to bear in mind that such a view does not take into consideration the presence of
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23. The demand for investment may depend not on nominal interest rates but on real interest rates. Then, if only
the expected rate of inflation increases with no change in nominal interest rates, the real interest rate falls, and
investment increases.asymmetry in price adjustment (i.e., downward stickiness of prices). There is a good
possibility that the downward stickiness of prices can be explained considerably by an
increase in inflationary expectations. Even so, if the management of monetary policy
is based on the consideration of cost and benefit in pursuit of the policy objective of
facilitating a smooth convergence to a new equilibrium price in response to an exter-
nal shock, the policy response may be different depending on whether the price is
lower or higher than the equilibrium price. If a large cost is involved in reducing
nominal prices that are kept high, there may not be an incentive to use monetary
policy to reduce them.
The second objection is raised in connection with the discussion on the competi-
tive structure of markets. From this standpoint, the absolute level and changes in the
markup ratio are basically determined by regulation, market concentration, and other
factors related to the competitive structure of markets.
24 The conclusion is that the
markup ratio cannot be directly controlled by monetary instruments alone.
In response, it is possible to argue in the following way. The role of monetary pol-
icy in the menu-cost theorem is to bring the markup ratio back to a level consistent
with the competitive structure of the market by controlling the demand curve appro-
priately when an external shock causes the ratio to deviate temporarily from the new
equilibrium value. 
However, the underlying markup ratio in each market is determined by the degree
of oligopoly and other aspects of the market structure, so that it cannot be controlled
by monetary policy or other monetary instruments. For these matters, it is necessary
to apply deregulation and other market-specific industrial policy measures so as to
make the market structure more competitive. That is to say, it would become
possible to increase social welfare efficiently only by using both types of policy
instruments in an appropriate combination.
In addition to these two objections, there are other traditional objections to the
menu-cost theorem: (1) the menu cost, even if it exists, should be extremely small, so
that it is unreasonable to try to explain large macroeconomic fluctuations on that
basis alone; and (2) if one assumes that society is made up of rational individuals, it is
difficult to imagine that they will leave the large imbalance of supply and demand
unattended. In view of these objections, it is unreasonable that the monetary authori-
ties should rely entirely on the theorem as a theoretical justification for stressing the
observed changes in the markup ratio in their conduct of monetary policy. In the fol-
lowing section, we will examine the alternative theoretical basis for such monetary
policy, as presented by Goodfriend (1995).
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24. In fact, Ariga, Ohkusa, and Nojima (1994) make it clear that, in the case of Japanese manufacturing indus-
tries, the ability of marginal cost to explain the movement of price grows smaller as the degree of concentration
or the cost of distribution increases.IV. Markup Pricing and the Social Welfare Cost of Inflation
A. A Basic Line of Thought
An increase in inflation forces firms and households to spend more time and energy
on search activities by increasing the dispersion of prices.
25 Although these search
activities may be considered rational from the point of view of utility maximization
for each economic agent, they are not necessarily desirable from the point of view of
society because they represent uses of time and energy that should have been
expended to produce goods and services. This is the thrust of the argument concern-
ing the social welfare cost of inflation, which is often employed as a theoretical basis
for the government’s use of policy measures to achieve price stability.
26
It should be noted, however, that the condition of perfect competition in the
goods market is assumed in these discussions. If there is markup pricing in the goods mar-
ket, the above discussions must take into consideration the following two effects:
27
(1) under the framework of imperfect competition, a change in the markup ratio
affects output, employment, and the real wage rate, bringing about a change in con-
sumers’ search activities; and (2) an increase in inflation increases the competitiveness 
of the market by promoting search activities, and hence increasing social welfare.
Of these two effects, the first effect is analyzed in detail by Goodfriend (1995).
The thrust of the Goodfriend model is as follows.
28 Assuming imperfect competition
(with only labor as an input), an increase in the markup ratio lowers employment
and hence the real wage by reducing output. Thus, a representative consumer is
forced to spend more time on search activities. As a result, there is a social welfare
loss amounting to the product of the marginal productivity of labor and the
additional time spent on search activities.
As will be stated later, the social welfare cost of inflation given by Goodfriend
(1995) is equal to the level corresponding to the product of the social welfare cost of
inflation under perfect competition given by Lucas (1993)
29 and the marginal
markup ratio. This type of argument provides an interpretation as to why the mone-
tary authorities should pay attention to the markup ratio when seeking to minimize
the social welfare cost of inflation. That is to say, if the markup ratio is in fact
observed or forecast to remain substantially high for some reason, the socially optimal
policy for the monetary authorities is to tighten monetary conditions further so as to
reduce the rate of inflation, even though the nominal rate of inflation may remain
low and stable. This is true even if the policy prescription suggested by the menu-cost
theorem is not effective for the reasons mentioned in the previous section.
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25. For empirical analyses of this point, see, for example, Ariga et al. (1992) and Fukuda, Teruyama, and Toda
(1991).
26. See, for example, Economic Report of the President (1990).
27. We do not discuss the second effect in this paper. Benabou (1992) analyzes the relationship between the rate of
inflation and the markup ratio in the U.S. retail industry to show that an increase in inflation has the effect of
lowering the markup ratio by exerting competitive pressure on the market.
28. See Appendix 4 for the derivation of the model.
29. Lucas (1993) calculated the social welfare cost of inflation by taking note of the fact that economic agents must
spend part of their leisure time on search activities because the rise in nominal interest rates associated with
inflation causes them to hold less money. The analysis of Lucas, however, is limited to the case where the rate of
inflation is at a steady state.47
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B. A Simple Trial Estimation
The model of Goodfriend (1995) as explained above presents an interesting insight
into assessing the monetary policy of the period following the Plaza Accord in 1985.
The usual discussion on the social welfare cost of inflation would suggest that, as the
rate of inflation has subsided since 1985, the dispersion of prices has decreased, thus
raising social welfare. However, as we saw in Section II, the markup ratio remained
above the trend line for some time both for the manufacturing and for the non-
manufacturing sectors. Consequently, there is a possibility that, contrary to the con-
ventional view, the social welfare cost of inflation following the Plaza Accord was
larger than before, as a result of the relative magnitudes of these two conflicting
effects. To clarify this point, let us make a simple trial estimation.
30
The Goodfriend measure of the social welfare cost of inflation, f, can be
estimated in the following way:
31
f = 100 ´ (a/L)√ RmL/av (1)
where v = (a/mL)/{R[(M/P)/C ]
2}. (2)
Here, L is the amount of labor (employment) input, R is the nominal rate of
interest, C is real GDP, m is the marginal markup ratio, P is the GDP deflator, a is
the parameter of labor in the production function (with only labor as an input), and
M is the money supply.
Consequently, by substituting Marshall’s k (M/PC)and the nominal rate of inter-
est R,
32 it is possible to estimate from equations (1) and (2) the social welfare cost of
inflation corresponding to each level of the markup ratio in terms of percentage of
real GDP.
Figure 5 [1] depicts the movement of the social welfare cost of inflation, as esti-
mated by the method of Goodfriend (1995), for the post-oil shock period of fiscal
1974 to fiscal 1992. In the estimation, we have calculated the markup ratios sepa-
rately for the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, and compared them
with the case where the markup ratio is one (i.e., the case of perfect competition).
This is designed to obtain an intuitive understanding of how much the presence of
markup pricing causes a distortion in terms of social welfare.
30. It should be noted that the type of inflation considered in the discussion of the social welfare cost of inflation, as
in Lucas (1993) and Goodfriend (1995), is a steady-state inflation and can be forecast. Discussions of the social
welfare cost of inflation under uncertainty include the following points: (1) inflation makes it difficult for the
firms to make production decisions, causing them to behave more conservatively; and (2) because the determina-
tion of nominal interest rates does not necessarily incorporate the actual rate of inflation (i.e., there is a difference
between the expected rate of inflation and the actual rate of inflation), a forced redistribution of wealth from
creditors to debtors occurs during an inflationary process. In this paper, because the purpose is to ascertain to
what extent the Lucas measure of the social welfare cost of inflation remains high because of the presence 
of markup pricing, the estimation is made on the assumption that economic agents can make a perfect forecast of
the rate of inflation. See Driffill, Mizon, and Ulph (1990) for a comprehensive survey of the social welfare cost 
of inflation.
31. For the derivation of the theoretical model, see Appendix 4.
32.  In the trial estimation of this section, we are using M1 as  M, and the reference yield on bond repurchase
agreements as R.48 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1997
According to Figure 5 [1], the social welfare cost of inflation amounted to 
3 percent–6 percent of real GDP at the times of the two oil shocks. For the period
following the Plaza Accord, the social welfare cost of inflation declined to below 
2 percent of real GDP because of the deceleration in inflation. This indicates that the
positive effect of the deceleration in inflation on social welfare exceeded the negative
effect of an increase in the markup ratio. Thus, even if it is acknowledged that the
markup ratio remained temporarily high, we can support the usual argument that the
social welfare cost of inflation is lower with a lower rate of inflation. However, the
social welfare cost of inflation began to rise considerably from 1987 to 1990.
In comparing the result with the case of perfect competition (Figure 5 [2]), the
social welfare cost of inflation is higher because of the presence of markup pricing by 
0.3 percent–1.8 percent of real GDP. In terms of a trend, the distortion caused by
markup pricing decreased because of the trend decline in the markup ratio (also at
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[2] The Increase in Social Welfare Cost Caused by the Presence of Markup Pricing
(as a Percent Level of Real GDP)
Note: ∆ M represents the increase in social welfare cost caused by the presence of
markup pricing in manufacturing, and ∆N represents that in non-manufacturing.
The social welfare cost of inflation is expressed as a percent level of real GDP.
The increase in social welfare cost caused by the presence of markup pricing is
defined as the difference between the social welfare cost and the hypothetical
social welfare cost obtainable under perfect competition (m = 1), both for the













Figure 5  Time-Series Movement of the Social Welfare Cost of Inflation
[1] The Social Welfare Cost of Inflation in the Manufacturing and 
Non-Manufacturing Sectors (as a Percent Level of Real GDP)
Note: fM and fN represent the welfare cost of inflation under the markup pricing in
the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. f(m = 1) is the hypothetical
welfare cost of inflation under perfect competition.49
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V. Conclusion
In this paper, we first calculated the markup ratios of various industry groups over the
past 20 years, using output data inclusive of intermediate inputs. We then analyzed the
relationship between the markup ratio and other economic variables, such as external
shocks and the business cycle. The analysis has shown that the markup ratio in Japan was
influenced more by external shocks than by the business cycle.
Under imperfect competition with markup pricing, the firms were found to be
unable to adjust prices fully in response to a change in marginal cost caused by an
external shock when they set prices in explicit consideration of the cost of revising
prices. As a result, the markup ratio fluctuated sharply. Under these circumstances, at
least theoretically, monetary policy can provide incentives for firms to change prices
by affecting the volume of output in the short run, hence improving social welfare.
This was explained in a simple theoretical model.
On the other hand, with markup pricing, the social welfare cost of inflation was
shown to increase to the level given by the product of the cost of inflation under per-
fect competition and the marginal markup ratio. We then made a trial estimation of
the social welfare cost of inflation over the past 20 years or so, and showed that,
because of markup pricing, the social welfare cost of inflation remained high at the
range of 0.3 percent–1.8 percent of real GDP. It should be noted, however, that
because the markup ratio fluctuates less than the rate of inflation, the fluctuation of
the social cost of inflation can be explained more by the rate of inflation than by the
markup ratio.
Although a series of New Keynesian theories, such as the menu-cost theorem
introduced in this paper, do have some theoretical force, not enough empirical
research has been conducted to either support or refute these theories, making it dif-
ficult to form a definite conclusion. Even so, it is possible that the markup ratio not
only reflects the competitive structure of industries but also contains useful informa-
tion for the conduct of monetary policy. It is hoped that further research will be
conducted in this area, both empirically and theoretically.50 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/MAY 1997
Appendix 1: Derivation of the Variable Markup Ratio
33
Think of an industrial sector under monopolistic competition, consisting of firms
with the following production function:
where Q is output, L is the amount of labor input, K is the capital stock, M is the
amount of intermediate inputs, and intermediate inputs M are assumed to be used in
a fixed proportion to output Q (g is the coefficient of proportionality); Y is the
amount of fixed factors used in production. 
From the first-order conditions for cost minimization, we have
where w is the wage rate, r is the rental rate of capital, P is the price of goods (or serv-
ices), and l is a Lagrangian multiplier. Thus, the markup ratio of a firm (defined as
the ratio of price to marginal cost) can be expressed as follows:
Here, sM = pMM/PQ = gpM/P, which indicates the share of intermediate inputs in 
total output (PM is the price of intermediate inputs). Likewise, the share of labor
inputs in total output and the share of capital inputs in total output are defined,
respectively, as sL = wL/PQ, sK = rK/PQ. Furthermore, it is assumed that the relation-
ship sL + sK + sM = 1 holds in long-run equilibrium, where there is no exit or entry and
excess profits are eliminated.
According to Hall (1988), we can obtain from the relationship between factor
inputs and output the following markup ratio, as a measure of the monopolistic
power of the firm:
34
Q = m(sLL + sKK + sMM) (A.4)
where a circumflex indicates that the variable is expressed as a deviation rate from the
average rate of growth during the sample period. By letting V ˆ denote the deviation
from the average rate of growth of output expressed in value-added terms, we have
M Q = min[F(L, K ) – Y, –––] (A.1) g
PFL PFK M = gQ, –––– = –––– = l (A.2) w         r
1    1 – – = –– + sM. (A.3) m     l
33. For details, see Benabou (1992).
34. In practice, the method of Hall (1988) is based on the use of output data expressed in value-added terms. For the
Japanese data, Baba (1995) summarizes the bias caused by using value-added data as well as how the estimation
results change when intermediate inputs are explicitly incorporated into the production function.
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V = mVA(sL,VAL + sK,VAK) (A.5)
where  sL,VA,  sK,VA are the shares of labor inputs and capital inputs, respectively, in 
value-added terms, defined as sL,VA = sL/1 – sM and sK,VA = sK/(1 – sM). Now, we have the
following relationship between the markup ratio in output terms m and the markup
ratio in value-added terms mVA:
By running a regression on equation (A.4) or (A.5), it is possible to estimate the
average markup ratio during the sample period. The variable markup ratio can be
obtained from the estimated average markup ratio in the following way.
From equation (A.3), the rate m ˆ of the markup ratio from the period average is
given by
where s ˆM = p ˆ
M – P ˆ = (1 – sM)(p ˆ
M – r ˆ ) and r ˆ is defined as r º (P ˆ – sMp ˆ
M)/(1 – sM).
In order to obtain l ˆ , let us specify the production function as F(L, K) = L
aK
1–a,
so that we derive the relationships sL,VA = a = 1 – sK,VA and l ˆ + w ˆ – P ˆ = sK,VA(K ˆ – L ˆ).
Finally, from equations (A.6) and (A.7), we have
By replacing mVA, sL,VA, sK,VA, sM with the average values for the sample period, it is
then possible to obtain the deviation rate of the markup ratio from the period average
in output terms.
However, since the statistical reliability of markup ratios in value-added terms is
extremely low compared with that of markup ratios in output terms inclusive of
intermediate inputs when Japanese data are used for estimation, we have decided first
to transform the markup ratio in output terms for each industry group, as estimated
by Baba (1995) into the markup ratio in value-added terms, by using equation (A.6).
We then derived the variable markup ratio from equation (A.8). We have eliminated
those markup ratios, as estimated by Baba (1995), when they were not found to be
statistically significant at 5 percent or when the data on the capital stock were not
available for the period after 1972. 
ˆ                ˆ         ˆ
m(1 – sM) mVA = – – –––––––––. (A.6)
1 – msM
l ˆ – lsMs ˆM 1 – sM sM m ˆ = –––––––––– =  –––––––– –––––––– l ˆ – ––––––  mVAs ˆM (A.7)
1 + lsM 1 + (mVA – 1)sM ( 1 – sM                )
1 – sM m ˆ = ––––––––––––––– {–s ˆL,VA – (mVA –1)[sL,VAL ˆ +sK,VAK ˆ+sM(p ˆ
M – r ˆ )]}.  (A.8) 
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35. For the pulp and paper and the finance and insurance industries, when the estimates obtained from the instru-
mental variable method are transformed by using equation (A.6), the resulting figures become negative. For these
industries, therefore, the method of ordinary least squares was used.
For reference purposes, the average markup ratios for each industry group are
summarized in the following table (the figures in shaded cells are those used in this
paper as the average markup ratios).
35
Table for Appendix 1
Industry




OLS variable method       variable method 
Manufacturing
1.337 1.283 2.726 2.319
(15.811)*** (22.562)*** (2.600)*** (3.675)***
Foodstuffs
0.696 0.734 –1.046 –0.299
(4.176)*** (6.413)*** (–1.167) (–0.624)
Textiles
0.849 0.791 –3.136 0.250
(3.157)*** (4.550)*** (–1.207) (0.359)
Pulp and paper
1.450 1.200 –0.059 0.997
(7.705)*** (13.610)*** (–0.027) (0.999)
General 1.144 1.206 1.163 1.758
machinery  (10.900)*** (19.325)*** (1.132) (2.854)***
Transportation 1.105 0.968 3.905 1.538
equipment (4.720)*** (8.110)*** (1.573) (1.646)
Non-manufacturing
1.488 1.461 5.655 1.669
(10.052)*** (15.868)*** (1.980)* (4.643)***
Agriculture, forestry, 1.955 1.096 6.944 4.057
and fisheries (3.131)*** (3.003)*** (2.196)* (1.839)*
Mining
1.530 1.101 –0.375 0.865
(3.211)*** (5.724)*** (–0.146) (0.696)
Construction
1.323 1.332 3.446 2.425
(9.986)*** (11.716)*** (3.550)*** (4.935)***
Electric power, gas, 0.914 0.653 1.924 2.856
and water (4.916)*** (5.813)*** (1.141) (2.290)**
Wholesale and  1.214 1.328 1.446 0.936
retail (4.783)*** (6.425)*** (1.732) (1.545)
Finance and  3.273 1.589 4.981 0.674
insurance (2.252)** (2.686)*** (1.144) (0.451)
Transportation and 0.951 1.160 0.755 1.256
telecommunications (3.406)*** (12.718)*** (1.211) (7.509)***
Services
1.020 0.878 1.064 0.740
(6.953)*** (8.219)*** (1.450) (1.621)
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate that the statistic is significant at the
10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Source: Pertinent sections only taken from Baba (1995).53
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Appendix 2: Time-Series Movements of the Markup Ratio by Industry
Group
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Trend lineAppendix 3: Derivation of the System of Equations Used to Estimate
Empirically the Price-Setting Behavior
First, we will derive the price-setting function when there is no menu cost under the
framework of imperfect competition where the firm has price-setting power. Then, we
will use a quadratic function to describe the cost of revising prices in order to derive the
price-setting function when the firm explicitly considers the cost of revising prices.
A. Derivation of the Price-Setting Function When There Is a Menu Cost





By minimizing cost, we obtain the following demand functions for each factor of
production:
where r = a + b + g and A, B, C are constants. Hence, total cost TC is given by the
following:
36
Therefore, marginal cost MC is given by the following:
Concerning the demand for final goods, we assume that the firm faces a demand func-
tion with a constant price elasticity and that it sets the price by adding a markup over
marginal cost. Given this assumption and from the marginal cost specified by equation
(A.14), the firm’s optimal price levelP*when there is no menu cost is given by
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L
D = q wr p
MQA (A.10)
K
D = q wr p
MQB (A.11)
M
D = q wrp
M QC (A.12)
1 – — r











b + g – ––––– r
a + g – ––––– r
a + b – ––––– r





D = q (A + B + C )wrp
MQ. (A.13)





¶TC     1 MC = –––– = ––q (A + B +C )wrp
MQ. (A.14)
¶Q       r




1 — –1 r
ea b                       g lnP* = ln(––––) + ––––––––lnw + –––––––– lnr + –––––––– lnpM e – 1      a + b + ga + b + ga + b + g
1 + (–––––––– –1)lnQ* (A.15)
a + b + g57
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where e is the constant price elasticity of demand, Q* is the quantity demand when
the price is at P*, and e/(e –1) corresponds to the markup ratio (price/marginal cost).
Here, according to Rotemberg (1982), we assume that the firm maximizes the
following objective function, when it faces the cost of revising prices:
P(lnP*) – k(lnP – lnP*)
2 – c(lnP – lnP–1)
2 (A.16)
where P(lnP*) is the logarithm of the profits obtainable under the price P*, k is a
parameter applicable to price revision, and k(lnP – lnP*)
2 is the second-order term
when P(lnP*) is approximated in the neighborhood of lnP* by a Taylor-series
expansion. Since, given the price level of P*, the derivative of P(lnP*) with respect
to price is zero, the first-order term is deleted. The maximization of equation (A.16)
is equivalent to the minimization of the following loss function:
c W = (lnP – lnP*)
2 + –– (lnP – lnP–1)
2 (A.17)
k
where we impose the restriction that k = 1 for simplicity. The first-order condition
for the minimization of equation (A.17) is given by
which can be alternatively expressed as
Thus, when there is a cost of revising prices, the firm determines the price in the
current period lnP by the relationship obtained from equation (A.15) and equation
(A.19).
B. The Specification Used in the Empirical Analysis of the Paper
Given the above theoretical framework, the estimation will be performed on the
following system of structural equations.
[Demand function]
37
lnQ = a0 + elnP + a l lnY + vQ (A.20)
[Cost function]
1 lnP = ––––(lnP* + clnP–1). (A.19)
1 + c
¶W –––– = 2(lnP – lnP*) + 2c(lnP – lnP–1) = 0  (A.18)
¶lnP 
a b                       g lnTC = b0 + –––––––– lnw + –––––––– lnr + –––––––– lnpM
a + b + ga + b + ga + b + g
1 + –––––––– lnQ + vTC 0 (A.21)
a + b + g
37. In the estimation, P is deflated by the output-weighted price deflator for all industries.or
[Price-setting function]
Here, m is a constant that corresponds to the markup ratio in the model; and vQ,
vTC0, vTC1, vP are random error terms for the respective equations. For the cost func-
tion, we have used two specifications, namely, that in which technical progress is
assumed to be constant and thus is treated as a constant term in the equation, and
that in which the reduction in cost associated with technical progress is treated as a
trend.
38 In estimation, moreover, the actual quantity demanded Q is substituted for
the unobservable Q*.
39
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a                       b                      g lnTC = b1TIME + –––––––– lnw + ––––– ––– lnr + ––––––– – lnpM a + b + ga + b + ga + b + g
1 + –––––––– lnQ + vTC1 (A.22)
a + b + g
11 TC  lnP =  ––––[(lnm + –––––––– ln–––) + clnP–1] + vP (A.23)
1 + c a + b + g Q
38. There is a possibility that energy-saving technical progress, which occurred after the oil shock, has not been
captured.
39. In view of the cross-equation correlation among error terms, we have used the seemingly unrelated regression in
estimation.Appendix 4: A Theoretical Model of the Social Welfare Cost of Inflation
In this appendix, we will derive the methodology of estimating the social welfare cost
of inflation under markup pricing, based on Goodfriend (1995). The theoretical
framework is a real business cycle model in which the only factor of production is
labor (with no capital).
First, it is assumed that a representative agent has the following utility function
whose arguments are consumption C and leisure F:
Consumption depends on the real balance of money M/P and the time spent on
search activities S, as follows:
40
On the other hand, the production function, in which the only output is non-




where L is employment in time units, X is a technology parameter, and the restriction 
0 < a < 1 holds. The time constraint for the representative economic agent is given by
1 = Lt + Ft + St. (A.27)
The budget constraint in real terms is given by
Mt–1/Pt + Ht/Pt + Bt–1/Pt + (W/P)tLt + XtL ˆa
t – (W/P)tL ˆ
t – Ct
= (M/P)t + (B/P)t/(1 + Rt) (A.28)
where H is the fixed transfer payment, B is the balance of bonds held, and L ˆ is the
average economy-wide labor inputs in time units. Given the constraints of equations
(A.25), (A.27), and (A.28), the first-order conditions for utility maximization are
given from equation (A.24) as
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P )t = (
W —
P )tS (A.29)
1 – Lt – St = [f/(1 – f)ICt/(
W —





40. When conducting costly search activities under the conditions where the real wage rate cannot become infinite,
economic agents must want to increase consumption in order to raise utility more than the cost of search activi-
ties. Given the assumption that bonds must be sold first and converted into money before they can be used for
consumption, moreover, the specification of consumption does not depend on net financial assets (money and
bonds) but only on money.
∑ (1 +r )
–t [(1 – f)lnCt + flnFt]. (A.24)
t = 0
¥Equation (A.29) shows that the opportunity cost (lost interest) of holding an
additional unit of money is equated with the opportunity cost (lost wage income) of
spending an additional unit of time on search activities. On the other hand, equation
(A.30) shows that the marginal utility of leisure is equated with the marginal utility
of labor.
Here, we define the marginal markup ratio m as follows:
mt = Pt/(Wt/aXtLt
a–1). (A.31)
From this, we know that, because of the presence of markup pricing, the real wage
rate is below the marginal product of labor when price is above marginal cost.
Based on this system of equations, we find the following relationships:
St = 1 – f – {f[(mt/a) – 1] + 1}Lt (A.32)
St
2 = (Rt/av)mtLt. (A.33)
Finally, the equilibrium amount of employment L and the equilibrium amount of
time required for search activities S can be expressed as follows:
Lt = L(mt, Rt) (A.34)
St = S(mt, Rt) (A.35)
where L1 < 0, L2 < 0 and S1 > 0, S2 > 0.
The demand for money in equilibrium is given from equations (A.25) and (A.29) as
Under this model, the social welfare cost of inflation in a steady state is derived in
the following manner. From equation (A.33), S is the time spent on search activities
because the nominal rate of interest is positive. Then, in order to obtain the social
welfare cost of inflation as a percent of real GDP, we have only to evaluate S in terms
of the social opportunity cost of the time required for search activities (the marginal
product of labor) and to compare it with the level of real GDP.
That is to say, under markup pricing, the social welfare cost of inflation can be
obtained as follows:
41
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(
M —
P )t = Ct √ a/vmtLtRt. (A.36)





41. If we set the markup ratio as equal to one in equation (A.37), we have the methodology of deriving the social
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